

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

CD NO. 25X1

DATE DISTR. 24 March 1955

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW) 25X1

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

- 25X1

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

## SUGGESTIONS

# INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

**Rest Country**

**DATE INDEXED**

**SED Doubts as to Soviet Policy on Germany**

NO. OF PAGES

**NO. OF ENCLS.  
LISTED BELOW**

25X1

**SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.**

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

25X1

1. It was learned that the SED Politbüro had asked the East German government delegation to the Moscow security conference to express its concern over the Kremlin's German policy. It was feared by the Politbüro that the USSR in its attempt to establish a status of peaceful coexistence between the Eastern and Western camps might be inclined to sacrifice the GDR and the SED if this proved necessary.
2. The SED Politbüro, which seems to be convinced that the Paris agreements will be ratified, believes the implementation of these pacts and the reunification of Germany are incompatible. It therefore demands extensive security measures along the zonal boundaries. This problem was discussed between Molotov and Petr N. Pospelov on the one hand, and Albert Schreiner and ex-Field Marshal Paulus on the other in Dresden in October 1954. On that occasion, Molotov promised much more financial help for the enlargement of the KVP than was conceded at the Moscow conference after Poland and Czechoslovakia had protested against an excessive rearmament of East Germany.
3. The distrust of the SED Politbüro in the Kremlin's foreign policies was further nourished by the fact that the importance of the Saar problem was played down in Moscow. The German delegation had suggested that the betrayal of the Saar by Adenauer should be given wide publicity in the propaganda campaign against the rearmament of West Germany. This was, however, rejected by the Soviets, who held that the ratification of the Paris agreements was not to be interpreted as preventing the reunification of Germany for good. The formula imposed by the Soviets for propaganda activities was that the ratification of these treaties would postpone the reunification for many years.

25X1

**CLASSIFICATION SECRET**

STATE		X	NAVY	X	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION			
ARMY		X	AIR	X	FBI				

25X1

**Page Denied**